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Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets†
By James Andreoni and Charles Sprenger*
Experimentally elicited discount rates are frequently higher than what 
seems reasonable for economic decision-making. Such high rates are 
often attributed to present-biased discounting. A well-known bias of 
standard measurements is the assumption of linear consumption util-
ity. Attempting to correct this bias using measures of risk aversion 
to identify concavity, researchers find reasonable discounting but at 
the cost of exceptionally high utility function curvature. We present a 
new methodology for identifying time preferences, both discounting 
and curvature, from simple allocation decisions. We find reasonable 
levels of both discounting and curvature and, surprisingly, dynami-
cally consistent time preferences. (JEL C91, D12, D81)
Understanding and estimating time preferences is obviously of great importance 
to economists, marketers, and policy makers. Consumers decide how much to invest 
in savings, education, real estate, and life insurance, how much to diet, exercise, and 
smoke, whether to marry, when to have children, and what to leave in their wills.
While there has been substantial research estimating time preferences using 
aggregate consumption data,1 the bulk of the effort has occurred in laboratory envi-
ronments.2 Among the many laboratory techniques employed, recent studies have 
favored multiple price lists (MPL) with monetary payments.3
With MPLs, individuals are asked multiple times to choose between smaller pay-
ment amounts closer to the present and larger amounts further into the future. The 
interest rate increases monotonically in a price list, such that the point where an indi-
vidual switches from preferring sooner payments to later payments carries interval 
1 Examples include Hausman (1979); Gourinchas and Parker (2002); Cagetti (2003); Laibson, Repetto, and 
Tobacman (2003, 2005).
2 For a survey of the literature, see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002). Recent contributions 
include Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002); Harrison et al. (2005); Andersen et al. (2008); Benhabib, Bisin, and 
Schotter (2010); Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010).
3 The MPL with monetary payments in economics was motivated and popularized by Coller and Williams (1999) 
and Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002). In psychology, a similar technique was employed by Kirby, Petry, and 
Bickel (1999) and has been implemented in several economic laboratory experiments, including Chabris et al. 
(2008a, b).
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information about their intertemporal preferences. Assuming time-separable sta-
tionary preferences and linear utility, individual discount rates can be bounded and 
potentially calculated from MPL switching points.4
A notable feature of MPLs (and other experimental methods) is that they yield 
high average discount rates. Estimates of annual discount rates over one hundred 
percent are common (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002). This is curi-
ously at odds with aggregate models of discounting which imply much lower annual 
discount rates (Gourinchas and Parker 2002; Cagetti 2003). A possible explana-
tion for this difference may lie in experimenters’ frequent assumption of linear util-
ity, which leads to upward-biased discount rate estimates if utility is concave.5 An 
important step in correcting this bias comes from Andersen et al. (2008) who sepa-
rately administered MPLs and price list risk preference measures based on Holt and 
Laury (2002) (HL) to the same subjects. Using both time and risk price lists, they 
jointly estimated discounting and curvature parameters.6 For brevity, we refer to this 
as the Double Multiple Price List (DMPL) approach.7
In this paper, we use a single, simple instrument to capture both discounting 
and concavity of utility. Notice that the binary choice of an MPL task is akin to 
intertemporal optimization subject to a discontinuous budget. Though under linear 
preferences the discontinuity does not influence choice, individuals with concave 
utility will be constrained. The potentially problematic discontinuity suggests a sim-
ple solution: convexify the experimental budgets. Hence, we call our approach the 
Convex Time Budget (CTB) method.
Intertemporal allocations in CTBs are solutions to standard intertemporal con-
strained optimization problems. Analysis of the allocations is straightforward. Given 
a set of functional form assumptions about discounting and curvature of the utility 
function, preference parameters are estimable at either the group or individual level. 
Unlike preference parameters estimated from MPL data, which are identified as a 
set of possible values, CTBs allow for point identification of preference parameters. 
Additionally, structural assumptions such as the dynamic consistency of time pref-
erences can be tested in simple and familiar ways.
In a computerized experiment with 97 subjects, we show that the CTB method 
can be used to generate precise estimates of discounting and curvature parameters 
at both the aggregate and individual levels. These estimates require a minimal set 
4 Price list switch points indicate approximately where sooner and later payments are equally valued. Take a 
sooner payment  c t , a later payment  c t+k , and a utility function U( c t ,  c t+k ). Under time-separable stationary utility, 
U( c t ,  c t+k ) = u( c t ) +  δ k u( c t+k ) and a switch point indicates where u( c t ) ≈  δ k u( c t+k ). Under linear utility, u(c) = c 
and δ is calculated as δ ≈ ( c t / c t+k ) 1/k . Discount rates are then calculated as IDR = (1/δ) − 1.
5 Under linear utility, u( c t ) =  c t and δ is calculated as  δ L ≈ ( c t / c t+k ) 1/k . Rabin (2000) shows that under expected 
utility theory, individuals should have approximately linear preferences for small stakes outcomes, such as those 
normally used in time preference experiments. However, a variety of studies show substantial curvature over small 
stakes outcomes (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002). If there is curvature to the utility function, then  δ C ≈ (u( c t )/u( c t+k ) ) 1/k . 
The direction of the bias  δ C −  δ L depends on the shape of the utility function. Concavity generates downward-
biased discount factor (upward-biased discount rate) estimates.
6 Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) propose a similar strategy of separately identifying the util-
ity function and discounting along with two other approaches for distinguishing time preferences from curvature: 
(i) eliciting utility judgements such as attractiveness ratings at two points in time; and (ii) eliciting preferences over 
temporally separated probabilistic prospects to exploit the linearity-in-probability property of expected utility. The 
second approach is employed by Anderhub et al. (2001).
7 Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) employ a similar approach with a risk price list task designed to elicit 
loss aversion. However, they do not use the risk price list to inform curvature of the utility function in estimation of 
time preference parameters.
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of structural assumptions and are easily implemented econometrically. On aver-
age, estimates of individual discount rates are found to be considerably lower than 
in previous studies. Across specifications, we estimate average annual discount 
rates between 25 and 35 percent. We reject linearity of utility, although we find 
far less curvature than prior studies using price lists for risk preferences. Indeed, 
almost 35 percent of subjects exhibit behavior that is fully consistent with linear 
preferences. Finally, to our surprise, we find no evidence of present-bias or hyper-
bolic discounting.
We also compare within-subjects results of the computerized CTB and those 
obtained using a standard paper-and-pencil DMPL. Our design allows us to make 
individual level comparisons. Interestingly, though individual discounting correlates 
highly across elicitation mechanisms, estimated curvature from CTBs is found to be 
independent of DMPL risk experimental responses.
Our results raise several important questions for future research. First, why did 
we find no evidence of present bias or hyperbolic discounting? One hypothesis 
is that this may be the result of measures we took to equate transaction costs of 
sooner and later payments and to increase confidence of receiving future payments. 
This interpretation suggests that some of the behavior attributed to present bias in 
the literature may actually be an artifact of differential risk or transactions costs 
over sooner and later payments. We explore this hypothesis in a separate experi-
ment (Andreoni and Sprenger 2012b). A second, more fundamental, question is 
whether we should have expected to find present bias? Though present bias has 
been demonstrated many times in experiments using money, the underlying psy-
chological models of temptation and self-control (Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and 
Rabin 1999; Gul and Pesendorfer 2001) make clear that present bias is about con-
sumption utility rather than money. Indeed, if subjects have access to even modest 
amounts of liquidity, researchers should be surprised to measure any present bias 
in experiments with monetary rewards.8 Third, we find substantial within-subject 
differences between our CTB and DMPL measures of utility function curvature. 
This may suggest a real difference in the utility parameters that apply in uncertain 
and certain environments. Utility differences across certainty and uncertainty arise 
in some form in many static and intertemporal models of decision making (Selden 
1978; Kreps and Porteus 1978; Epstein and Zin 1989; Schoemaker 1982; Neilson 
1992; Schmidt 1998; Diecidue, Schmidt, and Wakker 2004) and were originally 
suggested by Allais (1953).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I explains the motivation of the CTB and 
design for the CTB experiment. Section II outlines several econometric specifica-
tions while Section III presents group and individual analysis. Section IV concludes.
I. Experimental Design: Convex Time Budgets
In each decision of an MPL, subjects choose either an amount  c t , available at time 
t, or an amount  c t+k >  c t , available after a delay of k > 0 periods. Let (1 + r) be the 
8 We thank Matthew Rabin for persistently and amicably reminding us of this point.
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experimental gross interest rate and m be the experimental budget.9 Assuming some 
utility function, U( c t ,  c t+k ), the MPL task asks subjects to maximize utility subject 
to the discrete budget set:
(1) ((1 + r) c t ,  c t+k ) ∈ {(m, 0), (0, m)}.
Assuming linear utility, the corner solution constraints of (1) are nonbinding. 
However, if utility is concave, the constraints bind. One cannot infer discounting 
from MPL switch points.
Imagine, instead of (1), subjects choose  c t and  c t+k continuously along a convex 
budget set:
(2) (1 + r) c t +  c t+k = m.
This is a standard future-value budget constraint. To operationalize (2) we provide 
subjects with a budget of experimental “tokens.” Tokens can be allocated to either 
a sooner time t, or a later time t + k, at different “token exchange rates.” The rela-
tive rate at which tokens translate into payments determines the gross interest rate, 
(1 + r). Subjects choose how many tokens to allocate to sooner and later periods. 
This is our Convex Time Budget (CTB) approach.
Substantial information can be obtained from allocations in this convex choice 
environment. Variations in delay lengths, k, and interest rates, (1 + r), allow for the 
identification of time discounting and utility function curvature. Variations to start-
ing times, t, allow for the identification of present bias and hyperbolic discounting.
A. CTB Design Features
Our experiment was conducted at the University of California, San Diego in 
January of 2009. Subjects faced 45 convex budget decisions. These 45 budgets 
involved nine combinations of starting times, t, and delay lengths, k, with annual 
interest rates that varied from zero to over 1,000 percent per year.
A (3 × 3) design was implemented with three sooner payment dates, t = (0, 7, 35) 
days from the experiment date, crossed with three delay lengths, (k = 35, 70, 98) 
days.10 Thus there are nine (t, k) cells and within each cell are five CTB questions, 
generating 45 choices for each subject. We refer to each (t, k) combination as a 
“choice set.” The t and k combinations used in our study were selected to avoid 
 holidays (including Valentine’s Day), school vacations, spring break, and final 
9 Theoretically, extra-experimental interest rates and liquidity constraints should influence laboratory decisions 
(Coller and Williams 1999). If subjects can borrow (save) at rates inferior (superior) to the rates offered in the lab, 
then they have an arbitrage opportunity. If subjects are credit constrained, they may choose sooner experimental 
payments to smooth consumption. In a controlled experiment with MPLs, Coller and Williams (1999) show that 
providing external interest rate information and elaborating possible arbitrage strategies makes treated subjects 
appear only slightly more patient. Meier and Sprenger (2010) show that objectively measured credit constraints 
taken from individual credit reports are generally uncorrelated with MPL responses. For further discussion on 
arbitrage opportunities and liquidity constraints see online Appendix Section B.
10 See below for the recruitment and payment efforts that allowed sooner payments, including those for t = 0, to 
be implemented in the same manner as later payments.
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examination weeks. Payments were scheduled to arrive on the same day of the week 
(t and k are both multiples of 7), to avoid differential weekday effects.
In each CTB question, subjects were given a budget of 100 tokens. Tokens allo-
cated to sooner payments had a value of  a t while tokens allocated to later payments 
had a value of  a t+k . In most cases,  a t+k was $0.20 per token and  a t varied from 
$0.20 to $0.10 per token.11 Note that  a t+k / a t = 1 + r, the gross interest rate over 
k days, so (1 + r ) 1/k gives the standardized daily interest rate. Daily net interest 
rates in the experiment varied considerably across the 45 budgets, from 0 to around 
1 percent per day implying annual interest rates of between 0 and 1,300 percent 
(compounded quarterly).
Each choice set featured  a t+k = $0.20 and  a t = $0.16 (1 + r = 1.25). In eight of 
the nine choice sets, one convex budget represented a pure income shift relative to 
this choice. This was implemented with  a t+k = $0.25 and  a t = $0.20 (1 + r = 1.25 
again). In the remaining choice set, (t, k) = (7, 70), we instead implemented 
a t = $0.20 and  a t+k = $0.20, a zero percent interest rate. Table 1 shows the token 
rates, interest rates, standardized daily interest rates, and corresponding annual 
interest rates for all 45 budgets.
B. Implementation and Protocol
One of the most challenging aspects of implementing any time discounting study 
is making all choices equivalent except for their timing. That is, transactions costs 
associated with receiving payments, including physical costs and confidence, must 
be equalized across all time periods. We took several unique steps in our subject 
recruitment process and payment procedures in order to closely equate transaction 
costs over time, which we discuss in the following subsections.
Recruitment.—In order to participate in the experiment, subjects were required to 
live on campus. All campus residents are provided with individual mailboxes at their 
dormitories. Students frequently use these mailboxes as all postal service mail and 
intra-campus mail are received at them. Each mailbox is locked and individuals have 
keyed access 24 hours per day.
By special arrangement with the university mail services office, we were granted 
same-day access to a specific subset of campus mailboxes, and subjects in our exper-
iment were required to have been assigned one of these mailboxes. We recruited 
97 undergraduate freshman and sophomores meeting these criteria.
Experimental Payments.—We employed six measures intended to equalize the 
costs of receiving payments. These measures not only attempt to equate transactions 
costs over sooner and later payments, but also to increase confidence that future 
payments will arrive. First, all sooner and later payments, including those for t = 0, 
were placed in subjects’ campus mailboxes. Subjects were fully informed of the 
11 In 8 of 45 choices,  a t+k was $0.25. If an individual allocated all her tokens in every choice to the later payment, 
she could expect to earn either $20 or $25. If she allocated all her tokens to the sooner payment in every choice, 
she would earn at least $10.
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payment method and the special arrangement made with university mail services.12 
Eliminating in-lab payments ensures that subjects don’t disproportionately prefer 
present in-lab payments because they are more likely to be received than future 
extra-lab payments.
12 See online Appendix Section E for the information provided to subjects.
Table 1—Choice Sets
t (start date)
 
k (delay) Token budget  a t  a t+k (1 + r) 
Daily rate 
(percent)
Annual rate
(percent)
0 35 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.147 65.3
0 35 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.301 164.4
0 35 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.64 528.9
0 35 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 1.024 1,300.9
0 35 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.64 528.9
0 70 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.073 29.6
0 70 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.151 67.4
0 70 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.319 178.1
0 70 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 0.511 362.1
0 70 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.319 178.1
0 98 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.052 20.5
0 98 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.228 113
0 98 100 0.13 0.2 1.54 0.441 286.4
0 98 100 0.1 0.2 2 0.71 637.1
0 98 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.228 113
7 35 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.147 65.3
7 35 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.301 164.4
7 35 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.64 528.9
7 35 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 1.024 1,300.9
7 35 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.64 528.9
7 70 100 0.2 0.2 1 0 0
7 70 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.073 29.6
7 70 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.151 67.4
7 70 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.319 178.1
7 70 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 0.511 362.1
7 98 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.052 20.5
7 98 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.228 113
7 98 100 0.13 0.2 1.54 0.441 286.4
7 98 100 0.1 0.2 2 0.71 637.1
7 98 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.228 113
35 35 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.147 65.3
35 35 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.301 164.4
35 35 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.64 528.9
35 35 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 1.024 1,300.9
35 35 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.64 528.9
35 70 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.073 29.6
35 70 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.151 67.4
35 70 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.319 178.1
35 70 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 0.511 362.1
35 70 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.319 178.1
35 98 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.052 20.5
35 98 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.228 113
35 98 100 0.13 0.2 1.54 0.441 286.4
35 98 100 0.1 0.2 2 0.71 637.1
35 98 100 0.2 0.25 1.25 0.228 113
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Second, upon beginning the experiment, subjects were told that they would receive 
a $10 thank-you payment for participating. This $10 was to be received in two pay-
ments: $5 sooner and $5 later, regardless of choices, and all experimental earnings 
were added to these two $5 thank-you payments. This eliminated any convenience 
gained by concentrating payments in one period—two checks were sent regardless.
Third, two blank envelopes were provided to each subject. After receiving direc-
tions about the two thank-you payments, subjects were asked to address the enve-
lopes to themselves at their campus mailbox, thus minimizing clerical errors on 
our part.
Fourth, at the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to write their payment 
amounts and dates on the inside flap of both envelopes, so they would see and verify 
the amounts written in their own handwriting when payments arrived, thus eliminat-
ing the cost of remembering the future amounts owed to them.
Fifth, one choice for each subject was selected for payment by drawing a num-
bered card at random. All experimental payments were made by personal check 
from Professor James Andreoni drawn on an account at the campus credit union.13 
Individuals were informed that they could cash their checks (if they so desired) at 
this credit union, thus increasing the fidelity of the payment method.
Sixth, subjects were given the business card of Professor James Andreoni and told 
to call or e-mail him if a payment did not arrive and that a payment would be hand-
delivered immediately. This invitation to inconvenience a professor was intended to 
boost confidence that future payments would arrive as promised.
We believe that these efforts helped both equate transactions costs across pay-
ments, and engender experimenter trust. In an auxiliary survey, subjects were asked 
if they trusted that they would receive their experimental payments, and 97 percent 
of respondents replied yes.
Protocol.—A JavaTM-based client/server system was written to implement the 
CTB experiment. The server program sent budget information, recorded subject 
choices, and reported experiment earnings. The client program provided instruc-
tions to subjects, elicited choices, and administered a post-experiment question-
naire. Most importantly, the questionnaire asked subjects to calculate payoffs in a 
hypothetical situation and 97 percent were able to answer correctly.
Upon starting the experiment, subjects read through directions and CTB exam-
ples. The CTB examples indicated to subjects that tokens could be allocated entirely 
to the sooner payment, entirely to the later payment or divided between the two. The 
objective was not to lead subjects to interior or corner allocations with suggestive 
language.14 Screen shots of the instructions are presented in online Appendix E, 
which were read aloud and projected on a screen.
13 Payment choice was guided by a separate survey of 249 undergraduate economics students eliciting payment 
preferences. Personal checks from Professor Andreoni, Amazon.com gift cards, PayPal transfers, and the university 
stored value system TritonCash were each compared to cash payments. Subjects were asked if they would prefer a 
$20 payment made via each payment method or $X cash, where X was varied from 19 to 10. Personal check pay-
ments were found to have the highest cash-equivalent value.
14 Though we cannot be sure if the language led subjects toward or away from specific allocations, subjects were 
not shy about either type of allocation. Roughly 70 percent of responses are at corners, but only 36 of 97 subjects 
made zero interior allocations. See Section III for further detail.
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Subjects’ decision screens displayed a dynamic calendar and a series of nine 
“decision tabs.” These decision tabs corresponded to the nine choice sets described 
above, one tab for each (t, k) combination. Subjects could respond to the decision 
tabs in any order they wished. Each decision tab had five budget decisions presented 
in order of increasing interest rate and then in order of increasing budget.15 An 
image of the decision screen is presented in Figure 1.
For each decision, individuals were told how many tokens they were to allocate 
(always 100), the sooner token value  a t , and the later token value  a t+k .16 As each 
budget decision was being made, the calendar in the subjects’ screen highlighted 
the experiment date (in yellow), the sooner date t (in green), and the later date 
t + k (in blue). This allowed subjects to visualize the delay length for a given 
decision.17
15 For a discussion of order effects and presenting choices by increasing interest rate, see Harrison et al. (2005).
16 Individuals were not told the gross interest rate, (1 + r). However, in a companion questionnaire individuals 
were asked several numeracy questions, including one on compound interest. Roughly 70 percent of respondents 
were able to correctly answer a standard compound interest question. The level of numeracy in the sample suggests 
that the majority would be able to calculate at least the interest rate over the delay, k.
17 Because t and k were multiples of 7, all dates were described by the number of weeks (e.g., t = 7, k = 35 was 
described as “1 week from today” and “5 weeks later”). Note, also, that allocation amounts were initially blank on 
the decision screen and subjects used up and down arrows to make choices.
Figure 1. Sample Decision Screen
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Background Consumption and DMPL.—In addition to the CTB experiment, we 
implemented a series of three MPLs and two HL risk price list tasks (the compo-
nents of the DMPL). The MPLs featured the (t, k) combinations: (t = 0, k = 35), 
(t = 0, k = 98), (t = 35, k = 35). The MPLs can be used to create alternate mea-
sures of both discounting and present bias for comparison. The HL risk price lists 
were designed to elicit risk aversion or utility function curvature over $20 and 
$25, respectively.18
At the end of the computer-based CTB experiment, subjects were administered a 
questionnaire. Importantly, subjects were asked how much they spend in a typical 
week. The average response was $49.32 per week or $7.05 per day of “background 
consumption.” This figure is used later in our analysis (see Section IIIB).
II. Parameter Estimation with the CTB
Given assumptions on the functional form of utility and the nature of discounting, 
the CTB provides a natural context in which to jointly estimate (and test hypotheses 
of) time preferences, present bias, and curvature of the utility function. To begin, we 
posit a time separable CRRA utility function discounted via the quasi-hyperbolic 
β–δ discounting function (Strotz 1956; Phelps and Pollak 1968; Laibson 1997),
(3) U( c t ,  c t+k ) =  1 _ α ( c t −  ω 1 ) 
α + β  δ k 1 _ α ( c t+k −  ω 2 ) 
α ,
where δ is the one period discount factor and β is the present bias parameter. The 
quasi-hyperbolic form elegantly captures the notion of present-biased time prefer-
ences and nests the exponential discounting when β = 1. A value β < 1 indicates 
present bias and when t > 0 present bias does not influence choice. The values  c t 
and  c t+k are experimental earnings and α is the CRRA curvature parameter.19 The 
CRRA utility function is frequently estimated in experimental studies on both time 
and risk preferences and also used as the benchmark utility formulation across many 
fields of economics. The terms  ω 1 and  ω 2 are additional utility parameters which 
could be interpreted as classic Stone-Geary consumption minima, intertemporal 
reference points, or background consumption. For example, such utility parame-
ters are used in Andersen et al. (2008), where experimental earnings are added to 
background consumption, B, such that  ω 1 =  ω 2 = − B. The parameter, B, is not 
estimated in their specification, but set to 118 Danish Kroner, the average value of 
daily consumption in Denmark in 2003, around US $25 in 2009. Online Appendix 
Table A2 provides comparisons using various given values of  ω 1 and  ω 2 .
Maximizing (3) subject to the future value budget (2) yields the tangency condition
(4)   c t −  ω 1  _ c t+k −  ω 2   = {  (β  δ k (1 + r) ) ( 1 _ α−1 )   ( δ k (1 + r) ) ( 1 _ α−1 )    if t = 0  if t > 0} ,
18 The MPLs and HLs could also be chosen at random for payment. For directions and the price list tasks see 
online Appendix Section E2.
19 The CRRA utility function is at times formulated as  c 1−θ /1 − θ, with θ being the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion. This is equivalent to our utility formulation with θ = 1 − α.
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and the intertemporal formulation of a Stone-Geary linear demand for  c t ,
 [ 1 __ 
1+(1+r)(β δ k (1+r) ) ( 1 _ α−1 )  ] ω 1 + [ (β δ 
k (1+r) ) ( 1 _ α−1 )   _  
1+(1+r)(β δ k (1+r) ) ( 1 _ α−1 )  ](m −  ω 2 ) if t = 0
(5)  c t = { } . [ 1 __ 
1+(1+r)( δ k (1+r) ) ( 1 _ α−1 ) 
 ] ω 1 + [ ( δ k (1+r) ) ( 1 _ α−1 )  _  
1+(1+r)( δ k (1+r) ) ( 1 _ α−1 ) 
 ](m −  ω 2 )     if t > 0
A. Estimation of Intertemporal Preferences
Notice the parameters (β, δ, α) and the data (r, k, t) enter into the tangency con-
dition of (4) and the demand function of (5) in a nonlinear fashion. Naturally, if 
α = 1, only corner solutions are obtained. We discuss estimation of the parameters 
β, δ, α,  ω 1 , and  ω 2 when α < 1, and recognize that corner solutions may indeed 
arise in the data.20 We motivate two regression techniques, each with their benefits 
and weaknesses.
The first technique estimates (5) and the parameters β, δ, α,  ω 1 , and  ω 2 using non-
linear least squares. Online Appendix Section A1 provides the details of the estima-
tor. The strength of this methodology is that it estimates the Stone-Geary parameters 
ω 1 and  ω 2 . Its weakness is that it cannot account for the censored data issues inherent 
to potential corner solutions without additional distributional assumptions.21
For the second technique, we consider the tangency condition of (4). If we assume 
ω 1 and  ω 2 are (nonestimated) known values, we can take logs to obtain
ln(  c t −  ω 1  _  c t +k −  ω 2  ) = { ( ln β _α−1  ) + ( ln δ _α−1  ) · k + ( 1 _ α−1 ) · ln(1 + r) ( ln δ _α−1  ) · k + ( 1 _ α−1 ) · ln(1 + r)  if t = 0  if t > 0} ,
which is linear in the data, k and ln(1 + r), and reduces to
(6) ln(  c t −  ω 1  _ c t+k −  ω 2   ) = ( ln β _ α − 1 ) ⋅  1 t=0 + ( ln δ _ α − 1 ) ⋅ k + ( 1 _ α − 1 ) ⋅ ln(1 + r),
where  1 t=0 is an indicator for the time period t = 0. Given an additive error struc-
ture, such a linear equation is easily estimated, with parameter estimates for δ, β, 
20 With the employed utility formulation and α < 1, corner solutions can be predicted provided  ω 1 and  ω 2 < 0. 
As discussed in Section III, corner solutions are frequent. Online Appendix Tables A6 and A7 provide individual 
estimates and demonstrate that for the motivated regression techniques, individuals with only corner solutions have 
estimated values of α = 0.999, while individuals with more interior solutions are estimated to have more utility 
function curvature. This gives support to the employed regression techniques for identifying utility function curva-
ture and near linear preferences. Indeed, estimated curvature is found to correlate strongly with the discussed bias 
in MPL-based discounting estimates. See Section IIIC for details.
21 However, with such an assumption we could reduce the sum of squared residuals to the solution function (5) 
recognizing that  c t will be censored in the interval [0, m/(1 + r)]. Details of an NLS estimator of (5) adapted for 
censoring are provided in online Appendix Section A1 and discussed in Section III. We thank an anonymous referee 
for this very helpful suggestion.
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and α obtained via nonlinear combinations of coefficient estimates. The weakness 
of estimation based on the tangency condition of (4) is that it requires first that the 
background parameters  ω 1 and  ω 2 be known, and second that the consumption ratio 
( c t −  ω 1 / c t+k −  ω 2 ) be strictly positive, such that the log transform is well-defined. 
The strength, however, is that censoring issues are easily addressed. Two-limit Tobit 
maximum likelihood regressions can be implemented to account for corner solu-
tions (Wooldridge 2002). Online Appendix A2 provides details.
Of additional interest in the present analysis is robustness to alternate functional 
forms for utility.22 A leading alternative utility formulation, constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA) utility is also easily estimable in the CTB environment. Indeed, 
because of the exponential form background parameters drop out of the marginal 
condition if  ω 1 =  ω 2 . The marginal condition can be written
 exp(−ρ( c t −  c t+k )) = {  β  δ k · (1 + r)   δ k · (1 + r)  if t = 0  if t > 0},
where ρ represents the coefficient of absolute risk aversion in the utility formulation 
u( c t ) = − exp(− ρ c t ). Taking logs and rearranging, this is linear in the data  1 t=0 , k, 
and ln(1 + r), reducing to
(7)  c t −  c t+k = ( ln β _− ρ  ) ⋅  1 t=0 + ( ln δ _− ρ  ) ⋅ k + ( 1 _ − ρ ) ⋅ ln(1 + r).
Both this tangency condition and the solution function,
(8)  c t = ( ln β _− ρ  ) ⋅   1 t=0  _ 2 + r + ( ln δ _− ρ  ) ⋅  k _ 2 + r + ( 1 _ − ρ ) ⋅  
ln(1 + r) _
2 + r  +  
m _ 
2 + r ,
can be easily estimated via similar Two-limit Tobit maximum likelihood regres-
sion techniques. Online Appendix A2 provides further detail. A CARA specification 
eliminates the need to estimate additional utility parameters and is easily handled 
with standard estimation techniques, but does not readily allow for comparison with 
prior CRRA estimates and different background assumptions. Given that each esti-
mation strategy has its relative strengths, we provide all estimates and discuss any 
differences in our analysis.
III. Experimental Results
The results are presented in two subsections. First, we present aggregate CTB data 
and provide estimates of aggregate discounting, present bias, and curvature. Second, 
we explore individual level results, estimating preference parameters and comparing 
the results within-subject to parameters obtained from DMPL methodology.
22 We thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions related to estimating this alternate functional form.
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A. Aggregate Analysis
We identify experimental allocations as solutions to standard intertemporal opti-
mization problems. These solutions are functions of our parameters of interest (dis-
counting and curvature), and experimentally varied parameters (interest rates and 
delay lengths). Our experimental results should mirror this functional relationship. 
In Figure 2 we plot the mean number of tokens chosen earlier against the gross 
interest rate, (1 + r), of each CTB decision. We plot separate points for the three 
experimental values of t (t = 0, 7, 35 days), and separate graphs for the three experi-
mental values of k (k = 35, 70, 98 days). At each delay length, the number of tokens 
allocated to the earlier payment declines monotonically with the interest rate; and 
at comparable gross interest rates, the number of tokens allocated earlier increases 
with delay.
Evidence for present bias or hyperbolic discounting would be observed in Figure 2 
as the mean level of tokens allocated earlier being substantially higher when t = 0 
compared to t = 7 or 35. Instead, we observe that the mean number of earlier tokens 
at each interest rate is roughly constant across t.
Notice that Figure 2 also reveals that choices respond to both changing interest 
rates and delay lengths in a predicted way.23 Masked by these aggregate results, how-
ever, is important individual heterogeneity. Roughly 37 percent of subjects (36 of 97) 
23 Additionally, there is support for a homothetic utility function as the mean number of earlier tokens does not 
change appreciably with increased income.
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Figure 2. Mean Experimental Responses Over Time
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have no interior choices in 45 convex budgets, consistent with linear  preferences.24 
Additionally, for the remaining 61 subjects, in any given decision, an average of 
approximately 50 percent of responses are found at corners. In the following section 
we discuss estimation of aggregate preferences following the estimation procedures 
discussed in Section IIA that can and cannot account for such corner solutions. In 
Section IIIC, we discuss heterogeneity and provide individual estimates.
Before discussing parameter estimation, it is worthwhile to discuss the possibility 
of subject confusion and error in the new CTB environment. One common finding 
from standard MPL experiments is that 10  –50 percent of subjects switch more than 
once in a given price list (Holt and Laury 2002; Meier and Sprenger 2010; Jacobson 
and Petrie 2009). We view such multiple switching as an extreme form of nonmono-
tonic demand. As the relative price decreases, tokens allocated to the sooner pay-
ment shifts from zero to 100 tokens and back again. Similar errors are more subtly 
revealed in the CTB environment as even minor nonmonotonicities can be identified 
and the law of demand can be tested. For example, in (t = 7,  k = 70) only 8 of 
97 subjects had some nonmonotonicity, increasing demand of  c t in response to an 
increased interest rate. To restore monotonicity for these eight subjects, one would 
need to adjust allocations by an average of 24.6 tokens with a future value of $4.93. 
In an MPL, multiple switching would require adjustment of (at least) 100 tokens 
with a future value of $20 to restore monotonicity.25
The CTB environment provides for the possibility of additional tests of subject 
errors and confusion beyond those of the standard MPL design. Our results indicate 
that CTB errors are small both in economic terms and relative to alternate designs.26 
This provides a stable foundation for proceeding to parameter estimation based on 
the aggregate data.
Estimating Aggregate Preferences.—Table 2 presents estimates of aggregate pref-
erence parameters. In column 1, the annual discount rate, present bias parameter, 
CRRA utility function curvature, and   ω1 and   ω2 are estimated by nonlinear least 
squares on solution function (5) with clustered standard errors.
Column 1 indicates, first, the aggregate annual discount rate is estimated at 0.300 (SE 
0.064). This discount rate is lower than those estimated by most other researchers.27
24 See online Appendix Tables A6 and A7 for individual censoring details and estimates.
25 Only one subject required an adjustment of 100 tokens to restore demand monotonicity. Additional tests can 
be made for income monotonicity and positive discounting. Some subjects violate strict income monotonicity, 
by decreasing either  c t or  c t+k in response to an income increase. In eight experimental budget expansions, 72 of 
97 subjects make two or fewer such monotonicity violations for  c t and 89 of 97 subjects make two or fewer viola-
tions for  c t+k . Such violations may be a consequence of natural subject error as on average individuals would have 
to adjust their responses by only 1.67 later tokens (valued at $0.42) to be consistent with income monotonicity. As 
well, there is support for positive discounting. For example, between the first, sixth, and eleventh budgets in Table 1, 
(t = 0,  k = 35, 70, 98), (1 + r) = 1.05, only one subject strictly decreased her allocation to the earlier payment 
in response to the delay increase.
26 Of course, in a convex decision environment, natural tests of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference should 
exist to examine whether the data can be rationalized by a utility function. Because our decision environment has no 
budget, intersections of these tests are not possible. Additionally, given the volume of corner solutions in the data, 
such tests may be difficult to design in general.
27 Similar results are obtained when adapting the NLS criterion function for censoring. See online Appendix 
Table A1. Notable exceptions of similarly low discount rates include Coller and Williams (1999); Harrison, Lau, 
and Williams (2002); Harrison et al. (2005) which all assume linear preferences and Andersen et al. (2008), 
employing the DMPL technique.
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Second, aggregate curvature is precisely estimated at   α = 0.920 (SE = 0.006), 
significantly different from 1 ( F 1, 96 = 155.18,  p < 0.01), but far closer to linear 
utility than estimated from the DMPL approach employing HL risk measures or 
other experimental estimates of risk aversion. For comparison, using DMPL meth-
odology with Danish subjects, Andersen et al. (2008) find a CRRA curvature param-
eter of 0.259. When allowing for this curvature and setting both  ω 1 and  ω 2 equal to 
minus average daily spending in Denmark, Andersen et al. (2008) find a discount 
rate of 0.101. When assuming linear utility, they obtain a discount rate of 0.251.
The third, and most prominent finding is that, echoing Figure 2, we find no evi-
dence of present bias. That is,   β is estimated to be 1.004 (SE = 0.002). The hypoth-
esis of no present bias, β = 1, is marginally rejected ( F 1, 96 = 2.82,  p < 0.10), 
with the favored alternative being future bias, β > 1. Obtaining a precisely esti-
mated   β so close to 1 is of specific interest. The general finding in both monetary 
and nonmonetary experiments and aggregate analyses is of substantial present bias 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002), with a suggested value for β of 
around 0.7 (Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman 2003). Figure 2 also provides model 
fits corresponding to Table 2, column 1, t = 35 days, demonstrating that the esti-
mated time consistent preferences closely fit the aggregate data. However, the  R 2 
value indicates that substantial variation remains unexplained, potentially related to 
individual heterogeneity. Individual analyses are presented in Section IIIC.
The finding of no aggregate present bias is at striking odds with a body of experi-
mental results in both economics and psychology. Reconciling our findings with 
Table 2—Discounting and Curvature Parameter Estimates
Method: NLS NLS NLS Tobit NLS Tobit Tobit Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Annual discount rate 0.300 0.377 0.371 0.324 0.246 0.275 0.254 0.335
(0.064) (0.087) (0.091) (0.173) (0.128) (0.162) (0.159) (0.136)
Present bias:   β 1.004 1.006 1.007 1.023 1.026 1.026 1.028 1.017
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
CRRA curvature:   α 0.920 0.921 0.897 0.977 0.706 0.873
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.017) (0.018)
CARA curvature:   ρ 0.008 0.007
(0.001) (0.001)
  ω1 1.368
(0.275)
  ω2 −0.085
(1.581)
   ω1 =   ω2 1.350 0 −0.01 −7.046 −7.046 — —
(0.278) — — — — — —
 R 2 /LL 0.4911 0.4908 0.4871 −7,642.74 0.4499 −5,277.56 −8.864.52 −7,772.91
Observations 4,365 4,365 4,365 4,365 4,365 4,365 4,365 4,365
Uncensored — — — 1,329  — 1,329 1,329 1,329
Clusters 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97
Notes: NLS and two-limit Tobit ML estimators. Column 1: Unrestricted CRRA regression of equation (5). 
Column 2: CRRA regression of equation (5) with restriction  ω 1 =  ω2 . Columns 3 and 4: CRRA regressions of 
equations (5) and (4), respectively, with restriction  ω1 =  ω2 = 0. Columns 5 and 6: CRRA regressions of equations 
(5) and (4), respectively, with restriction  ω1 =  ω2 = −7.046 (the negative of average reported daily spending). 
Columns 7 and 8: CARA regressions of equations (6) and (7), respectively. Clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Annual discount rate calculated as (1/  δ  ) 365 − 1. Standard errors calculated via the delta method.
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others is an important issue. A potential explanation is associated with our experi-
mental methodology. First, experimental evidence suggests that present bias may 
be conflated with subjects’ assessment of the risk of receiving payments (Halevy 
2008).28 Keren and Roelofsma (1995) and Weber and Chapman (2005) find in two 
of three experiments that when applying increasing levels of risk to both present and 
future payments, present bias decreases to some degree. Our experimental method-
ology is designed to eliminate differential risk between sooner and later payments. 
Indeed, in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) we show that when differential payment 
risk is exogenously added back into the decision environment, a hyperbolic pattern 
of discounting appears.
While our methodology suggests that equalization of payment risks may explain 
our findings, other hypotheses exist. Principal among these hypotheses is that 
present bias is a visceral response only activated when sooner rewards are actu-
ally immediate. For example, dynamic inconsistency is shown to manifest itself 
in immediate choices over healthy and unhealthy snacks (Read and van Leeuwen 
1998), juice drinks (McClure et al. 2007) and more immediate monetary rewards 
(McClure et al. 2004).29 In order to equate transaction costs over sooner and later 
payments we were unable to provide truly immediate rewards. Viewed in this light, 
our findings represent a potential bound on present bias. With delays of a few hours 
between decisions and rewards, present bias may have gone undetected. A second 
hypothesis is that monetary payments should perhaps not elicit present bias to the 
same extent as more tempting primary goods. Though the body of experimental 
evidence on present bias has used monetary payments, and high correlations are 
obtained across primary and monetary intertemporal rewards (Reuben, Sapienza, 
and Zingales 2010), the underlying psychological models are very clearly focused 
on the temptation of consumption utility and not on monetary rewards (Laibson 
1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999; Gul and Pesendorfer 2001). A third hypothesis 
is that unstudied elements of the CTB presentation encourage dynamic consistency. 
We explore this possibility in Section IIIC by comparing CTB present bias with 
MPL present bias. MPL-identified present bias is substantially lower than previ-
ously obtained and correlates significantly with that found in CTBs at the individual 
level, suggesting that aspects of payment mechanism and not CTB presentation are 
most likely responsible for the limited present bias in our context. It must also be 
recognized that our findings are one study among many, and clearly further research 
is necessary before firm conclusions can be drawn.
B. Robustness to Background Consumption and Utility Forms
Extra-experimental consumption poses an important challenge for studies of time 
preferences. While experimenters are able to vary experimental payments, subjects 
make choices over consumption streams including both experimental payments and 
nonexperimental consumption. It is assumed that individuals do not adjust their 
28 Indeed, this is the motivating argument for experimental front-end delays. See, for example, Harrison, Lau, 
and Williams (2002); Harrison et al. (2005).
29 In McClure et al. (2004), immediate monetary rewards were received via e-mail in the form of Amazon gift 
certificates directly after the experiment.
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nonexperimental consumption. That is,  ω 1 and  ω 2 are taken as nonestimated, fixed 
parameters. Prior research has set these to zero or fixed − ω 1 and − ω 2 to match the 
average value of daily consumption (Andersen et al. 2008).
In column 1 of Table 2, we report estimates of both Stone-Geary parameters   ω1 
and   ω2 . The hypothesis that  ω 1 =  ω 2 is not rejected ( F 1, 96 = 0.87,  p = 0.35). In 
column 2 we report estimates of an identical NLS procedure with the restriction that 
ω 1 =  ω 2 and obtain very similar results. This suggests the restriction that  ω 1 =  ω 2 
is not costly.
Columns 3 through 6 of Table 2 examine whether the results are influenced by pro-
cedures that fix rather than estimate  ω 1 and  ω 2 . Additionally, fixed values of  ω 1 and 
ω 2 allow us to easily compare results across the estimators motivated in Section IIA. 
We estimate nonlinear least squares regressions identical to columns 1 and 2 and 
impose varying restrictions on the values of  ω 1 and  ω 2 . We also provide two-limit 
Tobit maximum likelihood regressions accounting for corner solution censoring, 
corresponding to the same restrictions.
In columns 3 and 4, the imposed restriction is  ω 1 =  ω 2 = 0.30 In columns 5 and 
6, we restrict  ω 1 =  ω 2 = − 7.05, based on a post-experiment questionnaire which 
elicited average daily consumption of our subjects to be $7.05.
Some differences in estimated parameters are obtained across econometric tech-
niques. In particular, curvature is less pronounced when accounting for the censored 
nature of the data, as should be expected. Across econometric techniques, estimated 
preference parameters are found to be sensitive to the choice of background param-
eters. Both the estimated discount rate and   α decrease appreciably as the restricted 
value of the ω parameters moves from 0 to −7.05. The present bias parameter   β
varies in a tight range.31 These results suggest that the method of determining the 
ω parameters is potentially of great relevance. In online Appendix Table A2, we 
demonstrate the effect of changing the values of  ω 1 and  ω 2 on estimated prefer-
ence parameters for both NLS and Tobit estimators. The results indicate substantial 
sensitivity of estimated parameters (particularly curvature) to increasingly negative 
values of  ω 1 and  ω 2 . Corresponding  R 2 and likelihood values diminish accordingly.
Understanding the sensitivity of curvature parameter estimates to differing back-
ground assumptions is important as it speaks to the identifiability of the back-
ground terms separately from utility function curvature. As is clear from the log 
tangency condition (6), curvature is identified from the sensitivity of the back-
ground-adjusted consumption ratio, ln (( c t −  ω 1 )/( c t+k −  ω 2 )), to changes in inter-
est rates, ln(1 + r), while discounting is identified from the relative sensitivity of 
ln (( c t −  ω 1 )/( c t+k −  ω 2 )) to changes in both interest rates and delay lengths, k. 
Smaller changes in ln (( c t −  ω 1 )/( c t+k −  ω 2 )) in response to interest rate changes 
are associated with more pronounced utility function curvature. Of course, if the 
ω terms take large negative values, then ln (( c t −  ω 1 )/( c t+k −  ω 2 )) varies in a tight 
range around 0, suggesting more curvature. The logic can be seen within a single 
choice. Consider an individual who allocates her entire budget to the sooner payment, 
30 In column 4, the restriction is  ω 1 =  ω 2 = − 0.01, such that the log consumption ratio ln( c t −  ω 1 / c t+k −  ω 2 ) 
is well-defined.
31 Similar results are obtained when adapting the NLS criterion function for censoring. See online Appendix 
Table A1.
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yielding $X in earlier experimental payments. Under the assumption  ω 1 =  ω 2 = 0, 
the individual’s two period consumption stream is (X, 0), suggesting no desire to 
smooth consumption (i.e., linear utility). Under the assumption  ω 1 =  ω 2 = − 10X, 
the individual’s two period consumption stream is (11X, 10X), a smoother stream 
suggesting substantially more utility function curvature. Likewise, one can fix this 
same allocation and two levels of curvature, generating different conclusions as to 
background consumption. A similar argument can be made for discounting.32
Given the above challenges, it is helpful to consider alternate functional forms. 
As discussed in Section IIA, background parameters are eliminated from estimation 
under CARA utility if  ω 1 =  ω 2 . In columns 7 and 8 of Table 2 we provide two-limit 
Tobit CARA estimates based on equations (7) and (8). Virtually identical discount-
ing and present bias parameters are estimated under this alternative functional form. 
The coefficients of absolute risk aversion of   ρ between 0.007 and 0.008 again indi-
cate limited utility function curvature estimated from CTB responses. Taken as a 
measure of risk aversion, for a 50-50 gamble over $20 and $0, our CARA column 
7 and CRRA column 3 estimates predict certainty equivalents of $9.60 and $9.23, 
respectively. These values are far from the often-found extreme small-stakes risk 
aversion and require further research on the relationship between risk and time pref-
erences. This work is begun in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b).
C. Individual Analysis
Table 3 presents estimates of discounting, present bias, and curvature parameters 
at the individual level. For each subject, we estimate the parameters of equation (5). 
To limit the number of estimated parameters and facilitate comparison with DMPL 
methodology, we restrict  ω 1 =  ω 2 = 0. The parameters   β,   δ, and CRRA curvature 
parameter,   α, are estimated by nonlinear least squares as in Table 2, column 3.33 
As robustness tests we first conduct estimation restricting  ω 1 =  ω 2 at various levels 
and, second, we allow  ω 1 and  ω 2 to equal minus self-reported daily consumption. 
Additionally, we provide Tobit and OLS estimates. Obtained values are similar to 
Table 3 and reported in online Appendix Tables A3 through A5.
Time preferences and curvature parameters are estimable for 86 of 97 subjects.34 
The results are broadly consistent with those estimated at the aggregate level. The 
median estimated annual discount rate is 0.41, close to the aggregate values obtained in 
Table 2. Echoing the aggregate results, individual present bias is limited as the median 
32 Consider an individual who makes the same experimental choice as above, but at a slightly higher interest 
rate instead chooses to allocate her entire budget to the later payment yielding $Y > $X in later experimental 
payments. For a small enough change in interest rate, u(X −  ω 1 ) ≈ δ × u(Y −  ω 2 ). For simplicity, assume linear 
utility (the argument is maintained for any fixed level of curvature). Under the assumption  ω 1 =  ω 2 = 0, δ ≈ X/Y. 
Under the assumption  ω 1 =  ω 2 = − 10X, δ ≈ 11X/(Y + 10X ). The estimated discount factor will be higher and 
corresponding discount rate will be lower under the second assumption.
33 We opted for the NLS estimator to accommodate the restriction  ω 1 =  ω 2 = 0. Additionally, the Tobit estima-
tors require a sufficient number of noncensored interior solutions for estimation. Given that 36 of 97 subjects have 
no interior solutions, consistent with linear preferences, this condition would not be met for a number of experimen-
tal subjects. See online Appendix A2 for details.
34 We do not study the 11 remaining subjects. Eight of these subjects had zero variance in their experimental 
responses, allocating the same number of sooner tokens in each choice set. Estimation convergence is not achieved 
for two subjects and the last remaining subject gave an identical pattern of sooner token choices in every choice set: 
4 tokens in the first decision, 3 in the second, 2 in the third, 1 in the fourth, and 0 in the fifth.
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estimated   β is 1.001. The median estimated   α is 0.967, suggesting that  individual 
curvature, like aggregate curvature, is limited. In addition to median values, Table 3 
reports the fifth to ninety-fifth percentile range for individual estimates of the annual 
discount rate,   δ,   β, and   α along with the minimum and maximum values estimated. 
For the majority of subjects, the employed estimation strategy generates reason-
able parameter estimates. However, extreme observations do exist. Figure 3, panel A 
presents histograms of individual curvature and discounting estimates from the 
CTB methodology. The histograms demonstrate that a large proportion of subjects 
have low discount rates, limited present bias and limited utility function curvature. 
Estimation results for all subjects are in online Appendix Tables A6 and A7.
Correlation Between CTB Parameter Estimates and DMPL Calculations.—For 
completeness, we compare individual discounting and curvature parameter esti-
mates from the CTB to those calculated from DMPL methodology. Three standard 
time multiple price lists and two HL risk price lists were administered to all subjects. 
From the three price lists, we calculate daily discount factors following standard 
practice.35 Given a switching point, X, a later payment, Y, and a delay length, k, 
in a price list, l, we calculate the daily discount factor as  d l = (X/Y ) 1/k . This is 
equivalent to positing a linear utility function and background  ω 1 =  ω 2 = 0. We 
examine the average of the three measures, d = 1/3 ⋅ ( d 1 +  d 2 +  d 3 ). From the 
two HL risk price lists, we calculate curvature parameters also following standard 
practice.36 Given a switching probability pair, ( p, 1 − p), and two HL lotteries, A 
and B, in a specific price list l we take the value  a l that equates the CRRA expected 
utility of lottery A and lottery B. We take the midpoint of the interval in which this 
value lies as the calculated curvature parameter,  a l . We examine the average value, 
a = 1/2 ⋅ ( a 1 +  a 2 ). In both MPLs and HLs, individuals must exhibit a unique 
switching point to have a calculable discount factor or curvature parameter.
Of the subjects for whom we estimate   δ, 84 of 86 have a calculable discount factor, 
d. The median value implies an annual discount rate of 137 percent, which replicates 
the very high observed discount rates in MPL experiments assuming linear utility. Of 
35 MPL switch points yield an interval of the individual discount factor (Coller and Williams 1999), which is 
easily accounted for with interval regression techniques (Coller and Williams 1999; Harrison, Lau, and Williams 
2002). However, common practice for calculation takes one point in the interval (see, for example, Ashraf, Karlan, 
and Yin 2006; Burks et al. 2009; Meier and Sprenger 2010). We choose the point of the interval that makes subjects 
appear the most patient.
36 HL switch points yield an interval of the individual curvature parameter (Holt and Laury 2002), which can be 
accounted for with either interval regression techniques or alternative estimators (Harrison et al. 2005). However, 
common practice for calculation takes one point in the interval or alternatively the number of lottery A choices (see, 
for example, Dohmen et al. 2005; Holt and Laury 2002).
Table 3—Individual Discounting, Present Bias, and Curvature Parameter Estimates
5th 95th
N Median Percentile Percentile Min Max
Annual discount rate 86 0.4076 −0.1784 5.618 −0.9949 35.3555
Daily discount factor:   δ 86 0.9991 0.9948 1.0005 0.9902 1.0146
Present bias:   β 86 1.0011 0.9121 1.1075 0.7681 1.3241
CRRA Curvature:   α 86 0.9665 0.7076 0.9997 −0.1331 0.9998
Note: NLS estimators with restriction  ω1 =  ω2 = 0, as in Table 2, column 3.
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the subjects for whom we estimate   α, 77 of 86 have a calculable curvature parameter, 
a. The median value is 0.513 indicating substantial utility curvature.
We can also identify present bias in the MPLs by the standard methodology 
of comparing the (t, k) = (0, 35) MPL to the (t, k) = (35, 35) MPL. Fourteen of 
84 subjects (16.7 percent) are classified as present-biased, ( d (t=0, k=35) <  d (t=35, k=35) ), 
while the median present bias parameter, b, is 1.37 For comparison, using similar 
MPL methods, Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006), and Meier and Sprenger (2010) find 
around 30–35 percent of subjects to be present-biased and a substantially smaller 
percentage to be future-biased. In contrast, using closely controlled payments and 
the CTB method, Giné et al. (2010) find limited aggregate present bias and almost 
equal appearances of present and future bias.38 This further supports the notion that 
our unique payment methods resulted in fewer instances of apparent present bias.
Figure 3, panel B provides histograms of these calculations for comparison with 
CTB estimates. Figure 3 shows that present bias is found to be similar across elici-
tation techniques. Discount rates and curvature, however, differ substantially. Time 
and risk price lists yield systematically higher discount rates and utility function 
curvature than CTB estimates. As in Andersen et al. (2008), correcting for curvature 
from the HL risk measures yields lower discounting estimates. Performing such an 
exercise, we obtain a median discount rate estimate of 33 percent per year. However, 
such a correction may be misguided given the wide difference between HL risk 
measures and the CTB estimates. This motivates careful examination of the correla-
tion of obtained preference parameters across elicitation methods.
Figure 4 plots calculated DMPL and estimated CTB parameters against each 
other. In panel A the calculated discount factor, d, is plotted against the estimated 
parameter,   δ, along with an estimated regression line and 45 degree line. Panel B is 
similar for a and   α. No panel is presented for b and β, because of the sheer volume 
of responses near to (b,   β) = (1, 1). However, estimated present bias from CTB 
methodology,   β, and calculated present bias from MPL methodology b are signifi-
cantly correlated ( ρ = 0.255,  p < 0.05) as are   β and the frequently-used categori-
cal variable classifying present-biased (1), dynamically consistent (0) and future 
biased (−1) subjects, ( ρ = − 0.274,  p < 0.05). The correlation between DMPL 
and CTB present bias further suggests that payment methods as opposed to CTB 
presentation led to less apparent present bias.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows a high degree of correlation between MPL calculated 
and CTB estimated discount factors ( ρ = 0.420,  p < 0.001). However, most of the 
data lies above the 45 degree line, consistent with standard arguments that, under 
concave utility, discount factors calculated from price lists alone will be downward-
biased. Additionally, we can examine the difference,   δ − d, as a measure of price 
list-induced bias. Interestingly, this discounting bias measure is negatively corre-
lated with CTB estimated curvature,   α, ( ρ = − 0.743,  p < 0.001). Subjects who 
are closer to linear utility will have less biased MPL-calculated discount factors. 
This indicates that, though biased, standard MPLs do yield useful measures of time 
37 Present bias b is calculated as ( d (t=0, k=35) / d (t=35, k=35) ) 35 . Nine subjects are classified as future-biased 
( d (t=0, k=35) >  d (t=35, k=35) ) and 61 are classified as dynamically consistent ( d (t=0, k=35) =  d (t=35, k=35) ).
38 Additionally, Giné et al. (2010) allow individuals to revise prior choices. Present bias, as measured in CTBs, 
predicts present-biased revisions. This gives support to the CTB methodology for being able to both measure indi-
vidual preferences and predict important choice.
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preference and that the bias attenuates with utility function curvature as theoretically 
predicted. Importantly, HL measured curvature does not correlate with the bias 
( ρ = − 0.092,  p = 0.431).
The lack of correlation between HL curvature and price list-induced discounting 
bias is not surprising. It is generated by the apparent zero correlation in panel B 
of Figure 4 between HL calculated curvature, a, and CTB estimated curvature   α 
( ρ = 0.066,  p = 0.568). This is interesting because, under CRRA utility, the two 
elicitation methodologies ostensibly measure the same utility construct. Not only 
is the level of curvature inconsistent between the two, but also the correlation is 
remarkably low. Additionally, HL curvature cannot account for the bias induced 
in MPL discounting experiments. These findings suggest that the practice of using 
HL risk experiments to identify and correct for curvature in discounting may 
be problematic.
As we obtain different parameter estimates across CTB and DMPL methodolo-
gies, a natural question arises as to which is better for eliciting time preferences. 
Though the individual analyses suggest the CTB estimates are more reasonable 
and can better explain the curvature-induced bias in MPL discount factors, more 
research must be conducted before firm conclusions can be drawn. Additionally, 
recent work from Noor (2009, 2011) demonstrates that an alternate experimental 
methodology fixing monetary payments and having delay length be the object of 
choice can, under certain regularity conditions, elicit discounting functions. This is 
in contrast to most experimental designs such as both CTB and MPL where time-
dated rewards, with varying delay lengths and monetary values, are the object of 
choice. Though this new methodology has not been widely implemented, it should 
be tested and related to both CTB and DMPL techniques in order to both better 
understand the new mechanism and potentially understand which of the common 
time-dated rewards methodologies yields more consistent measures.
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IV. Conclusion
MPLs and other experimental methods frequently produce high estimates of 
annual discount rates at odds with nonlaboratory measures. A possible bias of MPLs 
is the imposition of linear preferences, generating upward-biased discount rate esti-
mates if utility is actually concave. Solutions to this bias to date have relied on 
Double Multiple Price List methodology: identifying time preferences with MPLs 
and utility function curvature with HL risk measures.
We propose a single simple instrument that identifies discounting and utility 
function curvature, that we call Convex Time Budgets. Allocations in Convex Time 
Budgets are viewed as solutions to standard intertemporal optimization problems 
with convex choice sets. Given assumptions on functional form, discounting and 
curvature parameters are estimable. Additionally, tests of present-biased time pref-
erences are easily implemented.
In a computer-based experiment with 97 subjects, we show that CTBs precisely 
identify discounting and curvature parameters at both the aggregate and individual 
levels. Across specifications, we find an aggregate discount rate of around 30 per-
cent per year, substantially lower than most experimental estimates. Linear utility is 
rejected econometrically, though we find less utility function curvature than obtained 
with DMPL methodology or most studies using HL risk measures. Additionally, we 
find no evidence of present bias.
When examining individual estimates, we find that MPL-elicited discount rates, 
though upward-biased, do correlate with CTB estimates. HL risk measures, however, 
are found to be virtually uncorrelated with CTB estimated utility function curvature.
These findings raise several natural and important questions. First, why did we 
find no evidence of present bias, while so many other studies using cash rewards do 
find present bias? The most likely answer, it appears to us, lies in the unique steps 
we took to equate the costs and risks associated with sooner and later payments. 
This is surely the most consequential aspect of our findings, and as such invites 
rigorous replication and testing.
Second, why do we find substantial differences between CTB estimates and those 
obtained with DMPL methodology? In particular, why is the curvature over time 
obtained from CTBs so different from and uncorrelated with the curvature over risk 
obtained from HL measures. Why can’t HL risk measures account for MPL-induced 
bias in discounting? At a minimum, these results indicate that using risk experi-
ments to identify curvature in discounting may be problematic.
Together, these two points suggest that future research is necessary on the interac-
tions between risk and time. Particular attention should be given to investigating the 
link between payment risk and present bias. One step along this path is provided in 
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b).
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